‍

Six weeks after the federal elections, the future governing parties CDU/CSU and SPD presented a coalition agreement. On 16 of the 144 pages, they set out their ideas on foreign, security and development policy. The preamble also contains fundamental statements in this regard, as does the chapter on the economy, which deals with a changed foreign trade policy.

‍

It is striking - also in contrast to the politics of former Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock (Alliance 90/The Greens): The term “values” rarely appears in the text, but the words “strategy” and “interests” are found around 50 times. For example, development policy should focus more on interests, including tackling the causes of flight or access to raw materials. However, the program usually remains vague when explaining individual strategies or strategic relationships; it only becomes more specific when it comes to defense. In other areas, the coalitionaries simply refrained entirely from visionary or far-reaching ideas, such as arms control, Russia and the European security order.

When it comes to China, the agreement only speaks of systemic rivalry and no longer of a partner and competitor as the previous government did. And unlike EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (CDU), who now uses the apparently more diplomatically smooth word “rebalancing” in relations with China, there is still talk of “derisking,” i.e. reducing dependencies in raw materials or technology.

All in all, the roadmap for future foreign policy may not sound like a big departure, but it sounds like more pragmatism with a sense of reality. With one exception, which appears particularly surprising after Donald Trump's increasingly chaotic announcements, and that concerns the USA. Although Friedrich Merz, the chancellor-to-be, has repeatedly been critical of the new US administration and has even stated that his top priority is to help Europe “achieve independence from the USA step by step,” the treaty praises the transatlantic relationship and even wants to expand it. Given Germany's heavy dependence on US security guarantees, this is understandable, says Jana Puglierin, head of the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, “but at home, this message neither creates trust nor does it reflect the true extent of the challenges ahead.” In any case, Merz would have enough power to take on the challenges: With the Bundessicherheitsrat (Federal Security Council), Nationalem Krisenstab (National Crisis Team) and Lagezentrum (Situation Center), the Chancellery will become a foreign policy powerhouse.

In the following, we document the most important foreign and security policy passages of the Treaty, which the SPD has yet to approve in a member vote. The CSU unanimously rejected the document on Wednesday. The election of the chancellor is expected to take place at the beginning of May.

SAFETY: Our security is under greater threat today than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The greatest and most direct threat comes from Russia, which is now in its fourth year of waging a brutal war of aggression against Ukraine in violation of international law and is continuing to arm itself on a massive scale. Vladimir Putin's quest for power is directed against the rules-based international order.

Our long-term goal remains a commitment to arms control and non-proliferation and disarmament. Our commitment to NATO and the EU remains steadfast. The transatlantic alliance and close cooperation with the USA remain of central importance to us.

We develop the Federal Security Council, as part of the departmental principle, on to a National Security Council in the Federal Chancellery. It should coordinate the key issues of an integrated security policy, develop strategies and provide strategic foresight, carry out a joint assessment of the situation and thus be the body for joint political decision-making. For a holistic management of crises, Germany needs a federal-state and interdepartmental National Crisis Team from the Federal Government and a National Situation Center in the Federal Chancellery, in which an overall picture of the situation is compiled.

We are committed to strengthening the transatlantic alliance and sharing the burden fairly. We remain committed to nuclear sharing within NATO. It is an integral part of the Alliance's credible deterrence. We are committed to vigorously developing the European pillar of NATO. Because of its geographical location, Germany as a central hub for NATO should be further expanded. We aim to introduce a multiannual investment plan for defense capacity, which ensures long-term financial planning security in accordance with the German Bundestag. Public financing programs should also be opened up for security and defense technology. We want to strengthen the Bundesagentur für Sprunginnovationen (Federal Agency for Breakthrough Innovations) SPRIND and enable it to also work in the area of defense.

We are creating a new attractive military service initially based on voluntary service. We are aligning our arms exports more closely with our interests in foreign, economic and security policy. We want a strategically oriented arms export policy, which gives the German security and defense industry, its foreign partners and its customers reliability. Export control permits must be reviewed more quickly and in a more coordinated manner. We are striving for harmonization of European arms export rules. We are fundamentally opposed to arms exports that pose a significant specific risk of being used for internal repression or in violation of international law.

EUROPE: We want to enable more qualified majority decisions in the EU Council. In developing the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), we are taking a leadership role. We want to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation. In addition, in appropriate cases, we will use intergovernmental formats, such as the E3 format (France, UK and Germany), including, where appropriate, non-EU states, as a format for foreign policy action.

In view of the geopolitical epochal break, Europe must provide comprehensive strategic sovereignty develop.

‍

We want to make greater use of the principle of enhanced cooperation in line with the concept of a ‘multi-speed Europe’.

‍

In the interests of stable finances and in accordance with the European treaties, Germany will continue not to be liable for the debts of other member states.

‍

Franco-German friendship remains of paramount importance for the whole of Europe. We will deepen it on the basis of the groundbreaking Élysée Treaty and its development through the Aachen Treaty. We also want friendship with our eastern neighboring country Poland to expand further. In the Weimar Triangle, we will seek close coordination on all relevant issues of European policy in order to act more united in the service of the entire EU. Other close partners should also be included in the "Weimar plus" format.

We advocate the swift establishment of a memorial to the victims of German aggression and occupation in Poland (1939-1945) on the site of the former Kroll Opera House and the establishment of the German-Polish House as a place of remembrance and encounter in the centre of Berlin.

‍

We are in favour of a gradual approach to integration for candidate countries that do not yet fulfil all accession requirements but are implementing reforms courageously without compromising the criteria or the integrity of the internal market. In particular, this may include “phasing-in” in EU programmes and policies, granting observer status in the European Parliament and Council of the EU, and associate membership in certain areas such as the CFSP/CSDP without voting rights.The important accession of the six Western Balkan countries, Ukraine and Moldova to the EU is in their mutual interest. We want to consistently continue the support efforts of the EU and its Member States. This includes the Berlin Process — because we must offer reliable prospects to the Western Balkan countries in particular, which have been waiting a long time for progress. Continuing the accession process with Georgia can only be considered again once doubts about compliance with democratic processes have been dispelled.

Ukraine as a strong, democratic and sovereign state, it is of central importance for our own security. We will therefore substantially strengthen and reliably continue our military, civilian and political support for Ukraine together with partners. In consultation with our partners, we are looking for ways to remove the frozen Russian state assets to make economic use of Ukraine's financial and military support. We stand by NATO accession perspective for Ukraine.

We strive for a comprehensive bilateral Friendship Agreement with Great Britain on.

NORTH AMERICA: Relations with USA remain of crucial importance. The transatlantic partnership is a major success story for both sides, which must continue even under the new conditions. In terms of trade policy, we are seeking close cooperation with the whole of North America. For us, Canada is a central component of the transatlantic partnership.

ISRAEL: Israel's right to exist and will remain part of Germany raison d'être. The viable perspective for peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians is a negotiated two-state solution.

TURKEY: Turkey is an important strategic partner within NATO, a neighbour of the EU and an influential player in the Middle East, with whom we want to meet geopolitical challenges together, from security policy to migration. A fundamental improvement in the democratic, constitutional and human rights situation is a central element for us. Relations between the EU and Turkey are of particular strategic importance. We regret that Turkey is increasingly moving further away from the EU's values.

GLOBAL SOUTH: We will intensify bilateral relations with the countries of the Global South and expand them into a global network.We will establish a new North-South Commission to address this relationship. Even with difficult partners, we must, as part of a value-based interest policy, be able to keep channels of conversation open and ensure support in the event of humanitarian crises. We pursue our strategic interests in the Middle East region on the basis of respect and reciprocity. We will support Syria in its stabilisation and economic reconstruction and attach clear conditions to this.

We want an Africa policy, that does justice to Africa's strategic position. The African Union is our partner. We want to support the implementation of the African Free Trade Zone.

The expansion of strategic partnerships with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean is of particular importance to us.

For Germany and the EU, a stable, free and secure Indo-Pacific region is of fundamental interest. We will continue to be present in the region. We aim to deepen strategic relationships with india at all levels, including in the global energy transition and in security policy cooperation. We are also committed to the conclusion of a free trade agreement with the EU. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea are close partners of values for Germany and the EU.

‍CHINA: We are seeking cooperation with China where this is in the German and European interest - especially in tackling global human challenges. With regard to our trade and investment relations, we urge China to comply with the agreed rules and to ensure full reciprocity. We must recognise that the elements of systemic rivalry have now come to the fore as a result of China's actions. Against this backdrop, we will reduce one-sided dependencies and pursue a policy of de-risking in order to strengthen our resilience. The status quo in Taiwan can only be changed peacefully and by mutual agreement.

IRAN: : With our partners France, the UK and the US, we will work to end Iran's nuclear programme, roll back the regime's destructive role in the region and halt its ballistic programme. We support international sanctions against the Iranian regime and remain firmly committed to adding the Revolutionary Guards to the EU terrorist list. We will increase pressure by closing sanctions gaps and providing targeted support to human rights defenders and, in particular, women.

We will strengthen humanitarian aid and provide it in a reliable, targeted and forward-looking manner. In doing so, we are examining a stronger commitment following the cancellation of other donors (the USA has cancelled large parts of USAid, ed.) in important areas.

Our development policy is guided by values and interests at the same time. Democracy, the rule of law and human rights go hand in hand with our foreign, security and economic policy interests. We need fundamental changes in development policy that better reflect and shape current geopolitical and economic realities. We want Germany and Europe to have good relations with the countries of the Global South. We will strengthen, coherently coordinate and align the integrated approach with better cooperation between the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministries for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and Defence. In order to increase the effectiveness and coherence of federal government public development services (ODA) and thus make the federal government's public image more stringent, we will reduce development policy interfaces between the ministries and bundle services that do not fall within traditional ODA departments in the BMZ. In the light of our interests, we will focus more on the following strategic priorities: economic cooperation and securing access to raw materials, combating the causes of flight and cooperation in the energy sector. We will establish a joint point of contact for foreign trade promotion and development cooperation for the German economy. The willingness of partner countries to cooperate in efforts to limit irregular migration to Europe and take back their own citizens is a key factor in the scope of bilateral intergovernmental cooperation.

Foreign cultural and educational policy is a central component of German foreign policy, an important element of Germany's soft power and thus a strategic instrument in global competition for reputation, influence, narratives, ideas and values. It strengthens Germany as a location for science and business. We will continue to develop it and strategic foreign communication in a targeted manner and utilise it even more effectively as a geopolitical instrument in line with our values and interests. gd