By Stefan Liebing and Theodore Murphy

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Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently proposed to buy more liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US appease Donald Trump's potentially aggressive plans for tariffs on European products. Yet this is exactly the opposite of what we should be doing. Our dependence on American gas supplies is already alarmingly high.

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Trump's election victory harbours the danger that Europe's various dependencies on the USA could be used against us. Europe is now setting about revitalising previously shelved initiatives aimed at protecting European sovereignty from a president who has repeatedly called for an end to European free-riding. From the European economy to defense, to the climate and strengthening European right-wing populists through future support from the USA: Europe is looking for plans to face the “four apocalyptic horsemen” of a Trump administration. But the four riders are joined by a fifth, lesser-known critical dependency: Europe's energy security in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG).

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For most economies, LNG serves as a supplement to long-term pipeline supply contracts. LNG is therefore mostly used to cushion peaks in demand and for diversification. China, the world's largest gas consumer, is one example of this approach. But this rule has also applied to Germany so far in view of the low quantities of LNG that have reached us via Belgium and the Netherlands.

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Russian gas deliveries to the EU by pipeline fell from over 40% in 2021 to just 8% in 2023. To make up for the difference, European energy suppliers primarily purchased LNG. As a result, the EU-wide share of LNG rose from 19% in 2021 to 43% in 2023. The USA now supplies half of this and thus three times more than in 2021. The smug patting on the back in European capitals over the clear cut with Russia belied the fact that the solution to the gas crisis for Germany, even more than for its neighbours, simply replaced one dependency for another: the USA against Russia.

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Since Europe is in a massive political conflict with Russia, it can be concluded that switching from Russia to dependence on the USA eliminates the threat. But the truth is that any excessive reliance on a single supplier poses risks. The security lies in diversification. With Trump, everything points to him being prepared to use trade policy instruments against friends and enemies alike. Biden already made Europe sit up and take notice when he ordered a halt to new LNG export plants in January 2024. But the transatlantic relations, which were regarded as good, quickly calmed down. That may be the reason why Europe largely ignored a subsequent communication from the Department of Energy dated February 23, 2024, which included a geopolitical approval criterion for US LNG exports for the first time. For example, the relevant legislation states: “We must not sell our energy resources to competing countries that do not match our interests and those of our allies.” This creates the conditions for using LNG supplies as a bargaining chip in a foreign trade dispute.

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Given the US's unique ability to expand its LNG supply in the short term, it was understandable that Europe turned to the US to fill a gap after decoupling from Russia. But this emergency measure has now become a permanent part of Europe's energy security. If Trump were to play the LNG card and impose export tariffs on LNG, for example, Europe would be left without a serious alternative.

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African solutions

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Dependence on the USA could have been reduced in recent years if European suppliers had also stocked up on gas in Africa. African LNG plants generate 60 billion cubic metres of LNG annually, which is half of the 120 billion cubic metres that Europe consumes annually. Some of the 60 billion cubic metres is already coming to Europe today as part of the regular supply from Spain and France, for example, as it existed before the Russian gas crisis.

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However, the new funding projects currently under development, which would enable a significant expansion of LNG supplies from Africa, are particularly exciting. However, Europe failed to make a determined effort to secure African natural gas offers when it ended Russian supplies. Numerous African producers were interested in selling LNG to Europe, but were largely ignored. The German move into the Senegalese natural gas market is an example of this development. When Chancellor Scholz sought to supply LNG with Senegalese President Macky Sall at the height of the European energy crisis in 2022, a promising proposal failed due to lack of implementation. Senegalese LNG resources required a long-term purchase commitment lasting up to twenty years, a risk that the private German energy sector did not want to take.

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German companies — in the midst of a massive financial crisis — were unable to bear this high risk alone. The conclusion of such supply relationships would only have been possible if the federal government had created incentives to diversify through government intervention. Different models would be conceivable here. For example, a federal guarantee to offset potential losses from such contracts if the market situation changes significantly. Or an obligation on the part of energy suppliers to diversify. Without such intervention, energy suppliers purchased replacement quantities for Russian supplies from the cheapest source — the USA, in accordance with market rules. Security of supply, however, is a public good. An approach based purely on market mechanisms will therefore not produce the desired result. Diversification requires regulatory measures. Since the German bureaucracy did not see such a need, the expected results followed: The gas procurement from Senegal did not materialize; instead, German energy suppliers relied largely on supplies from the USA. Senegal exemplifies a whole range of other countries in Africa that could expand funding and supply Germany with LNG.

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What can Europe do?

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The current situation and the risk of an aggravation from President Trump now require two measures:

First, with regard to natural gas, the EU and also the German federal government should take measures that enable private suppliers to diversify supply relationships and encourage the conclusion of long-term gas supply contracts. Natural gas must be a “bridge technology” for the transition to renewable energy sources. Those who present the transition to green energy as a binary decision overlook the fact that a supply of one hundred percent renewable energy will not be possible in the foreseeable future. In the absence of sufficient storage capacities, fossil options are needed when the sun and wind do not generate enough electricity. Natural gas is still the best option: It is easy to store, is relatively environmentally friendly and — unlike nuclear power plants, for example — can be switched on flexibly. And finally, the infrastructure, i.e. pipelines and import terminals for LNG, can later also be used for green hydrogen. Europe has already avoided difficult decisions by turning to the US to fill a huge gap in its energy security caused by Russia. Now Commission President von der Leyen has proposed relying on even more US LNG instead of reducing this new dependency.

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Secondly, green hydrogen can be a guarantee of energy security instead of LNG. When it is transported from North Africa to Europe via the same pipeline infrastructure as natural gas, or converted into transportable ammonia and delivered by ship, it offers a win-win situation. The sunny regions of Africa form the perfect starting point for using photovoltaic power, which can be used to split water into oxygen and hydrogen. However, this is still significantly more expensive than liquefied natural gas for the foreseeable future. Pursuing this option is made difficult in two ways: first, the EU has developed complicated rules to set criteria for the “environmental friendliness” of hydrogen imported into Europe, and secondly, it still lacks a plan to bridge the price difference to create incentives to diversify away from US LNG. To remedy this situation, the EU must adapt to African development realities. Africa shares Europe's green ambitions, but the road to achieving them will take longer. The EU and the member states, which are particularly reliant on energy supplies, must therefore take a differentiated approach to climate goals that takes into account the specific circumstances of Africa and Europe's very real needs for energy security. A package solution consisting of long-term LNG deliveries and close cooperation to establish a joint hydrogen economy would be in both interests.

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Hard decisions between environmental protection, energy prices and national security of supply can no longer be postponed. The new EU Commission must tackle them decisively together with a new federal government at the latest. Development policy will play a bigger role in this than many think.

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Prof. Stefan Liebing is managing partner of Conjuncta GmbH, a project developer and investment company focused on the African continent. He teaches as an honorary professor at the Africa Center at Flensburg University of Applied Sciences and was chairman of the Afrika-Verein der deutschen Wirtschaft e.V.

Theodore Murphy is currently an Associate Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR), where he previously served as Director of the Africa Program. His work focuses on the geopolitical aspects of strategic relations between Africa and Europe in the areas of climate, economics, peace/security and global order.

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